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THE OBJECTIVES OF ARMS CONTROL
James A. Barber, Jr.
Inll"Oduction. 'l'lw argumenL for arms
conlrol is persum;ive: arms raers arc
boLh expensive and inherenLly dangerous; Llwri!fore, any con Lrol or elimination of arms is good. UnforLunaLely,
appt·aling as this formulation may he, it
can III' a hazardous onc, ht'rause it i~ an
o\'t'r:::implifieation. AILhough arms conLrol can he highly ht'neficial, all arms
control is lIot n('ces~arily good, and it
can he dangerous to assume thaL it is.
Too of Len those of us whose professional concern is miliLary securiLy do
noL pay adt'quaLe aLLention to the relationship hetween ~ecurity and arms COIltrol. Yet arms conlrol and mililary
s(!eurity arc inlegral parts of the sallie
suhject-the safety and well-being of thc
nation. Bt'eause of tilt' curren t arms
control dialog with thc SovieL Union, it
is useful, and pt·rhaps necessary, to
examilH' the ohj('cti\'!~s of arllls conlrol
mOrt~ cardully. In vi('w of thc frequent
laek of clarity !'neounl!~rl'(l in discussions of arllls ('ontrol and di:::armalll('nt,

a revirw lUlIl reslalement of fundamental consideraLions should be useful.
Arms control and disarmament, although similar, are noL identical. Disarmament necessarily involves an arms
rrduction; arms control involves an arms
limitation of either quantity or typc and
mayor may not constitute a reduction.
1L is en tirely possible, al though unlikely,
Ihat an arms control arrangement might
involve an acLual increase in arms. Arms
control, as the more inclusive term, will
he used in thc remainder of this discussIOn.
The Objectives of Arms Control.
William C. Fost!!r has stated the basic
objective of arms control succinctly:
"[ n the final analysis, the decision
whether to negotiate a given arms("ontrol agreement boils down to weighing thl' risks of undertaking it against
II\(' risks of not undertaking it. »1 In
other words, arms control is intcndl'd to
do something for us, to, in sOllie way,
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leave us in a position preferable to that
is the effect on our position relative to
before arms control.
potential opponents? The reason fur
Thus any arms control treaty is not
distinguishing these three aspects of
an end in itself, hut only a possible
security is that, although they are intermeans to several ends. As such, it must
related, lIrms control does not ncccsbe evaluated in terms of how well it is
sarily accomplish thcm cqually and may
de~igned to accomplish its purpose. It is
accomplish one at the expense of the
simply inadequate to assume that all
others.
possible arms control arrangements are
After subdividing the objective of
useful or even that, because an arrangcsecurity and adding the economic and
political objectives, there are then five
ment serves one useful purpose, it is
worthwhile. An arrangcmcnt which is
fundamental qucstions to be asked of
any potential arms control arrangement.
highly desirable from one point of view
These are: (I) How does it affect the
may be extremely dangerous from anprobability of war? (2) What is its effect
other. It is necessary, therefore, to
on the intensity or duration of war? (3)
subject any proposed agreement to
What is its effect on our position rclapainstaking scrutiny to determine
whetlwr or not it will help us reach our
tive to potential opponcnts? (4) Does it
desired objectives.
save money? and (5) Docs it help in
What arc the objectives of arms
achieving nonmilitary mltional objeccontrol? Three areas of bene£it have
tives? It is highly improbablc thal any
been -Claimed: One has to do with
practical system of arms control will
provide favorable answers to all five
security: that arms control makes us
safer than we would othcrwisc he. The
questions. Thus it is necessary to weigh
sccond benefit is economic: that arms
gains in some areas against disadvantages
control would save money. The third
in olhers.
benefit is political: that arms control
The remainder of this discussion is
assists in the achievement of nonmilidevoted to a consideration of each of
tary national objectives. Each particithese five areas, their interaction, and
pant in a system of arms control seeks
the degree to which they are achicvable
these same benefits, though they may
through arms control.
be gained in differing proportion and to
different degree. These objcctives are
Arms Control and the Probability of
comprchcnsive in the sem;e that all
War. Prohably the mo~t fUlltJament:t1
important cffects of any practical arms
argument in favor of disarmament or
control or disarmament arrangement
arms control, and certainly the one
will fall into one of thc three catrgorics.
most frcquently asscrted, is thal arJlls
For purposcs of analysis, howevrr,
races and high levels of armament are
the first catcgory, dcaling with sccurity,
primary causes of war, and that thcir
needs to be suhdividcd. The effcet of
limitation or elimination will make war
arms control on security is complicated
less likely. For example, in a highly
and can bc contradictory. If the analysis
respected book, World Peace Through
can be elarified by dividing the question . World Law, Grenville Clark and Louis B.
of security into several parts, it will
Sohn state that "experience teaches that
help. From a spcurity point of view, the
long-continUl'd arms raceS have usually
three questions thllt must hI' m;ked of a
ended in violent connict, since the fears
pro~pl'ctive arllls eontrol armngl'nwnt
and tensions engendered by the compeart': (I) 1I0w dol'S it arrl'ct the proh.ltition cre'llt: <III atlllosplwre in which
hility of war'?; (~) What effed dOI's it
war lIIay hmak out almost by m'ddent
have upon the inlt'nsity or duration' of
and without a fixed design for war on
war if it does hreak out?; and P) What
either side. »2 Despite the prevalence of
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this view, however, iL is by no means
uncontested. I n a perceptive recent
book, Evan Luard, for exmnple, after
careful examination of the historical
relationship between the level of armament and the outbreak of war, concludes:
There is in fact no clear evidence,
nor obvious reason to suppose,
that the danger of war has ever
borne, or bears today, any close
relationship to the volume of
weapons possessed. There is certain historical evidence to support
the opposite view (the fact that
wars often break out when nations are poorly armed, as in the
Napoleonic Wars, the Crimean
War, the Balkan Wars, and others,
or stay at peace when highly
armed, as between 1948 and
] 968). If the will to war itself is
unchanged, arms will usually be
found to wage it. 3
The fact is that the relationship
he tween levels of armament and the
stahility of peace is a complicated one
and very far from the simple notion that
arms cause wars. In some circumstances,
even the failure to enter into an arms
race can hi! dangerous to peace. Hedley
Bull has stated that the military factor
most important in hringing about the
Second World War was "the failure of
Britain, France and the Soviet Union to
engage in the arms race with sufficient
vigor, their insufficient response to the
rearmamcnt of Germany.,,4
It would therefore appear that under
the right circumstances some kinds of
armament contribute to stability, while
other kinds are destahilizing. As an
example, given the present state of
mutunl nuclear deterrcnce between the
Unitcd States and thl! ~()viet Union, the
situation is more stnble if both sides
have relatively invulnerahle nuclear
strike forces, tending to make both sides
less trigger happy. I f both sides pos-

sessed only vulnerable strike systcms,
suse('ptihle to being inenpncit'ltml by II
first strikc by the opposing side, thc
situation would obviously be much less
stable. Therefore, an arms control arrangement which eliminated invulnerable strike systems while leaving vulnerable systems intact would be destabilizing.
I n the present state of our understanding, it is not possible t9 state
unequivocally any general relationships
between armament and the stability of
peace, although some tentative hypotheses might be suggested. For example,
under present circumstances, anyLhing
which reduces the credibility of deterrence would appear Lo be destabilizing.
Dynamic changes in relative military
strength, whether numerical or technological, also appear to be dangerous: a
powerful nation losing ground to a more
dynamic potential opponent has a
strong incentive to initiate hostilities
bcfore its relative position hecomes
worsc. On the other hand, developments
which assist in providing prompt and
reliable information about the capabilities and intentions of potential opponenLs (such as the "hot line" and
survcillance satelliLes) probably contribute to stability by helping to prevent
war hy accidcnt or miscalculation.
Furthcr complicating the relationship
between armament and the outbreak of
war is the fact that there arc many kinds
of war, and measures which make one
kind of war less probaLle may increase
the chances of another kind. A foolproof scheme of nuclear disarmament,
for example, might increase the probahility of conventional conflict by removing the caution engendered hy the
fear of nuclear escalation.
To summarize, thcre is a relationship
bctween armament and the probability
of war, hut it is ncither direel nor
simplt·. Pending bctter knowll·dge of tlw
relationship than we now have, ahout
the best that can he achieved is a
case-by-case cxamination of tht: implica-
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tions of specific wcnpons systems and
weapons control proposals in nn
attempt to determine their probable
effect. I n such an evaluation, it is
important to keep all of the ohjectives
clearly in view. lise of formal criteria,
similar to those discussed here, can he
useful in the study of probable effecls.
Arms Control and the Intensity of
War. Closely related to the attempt to
reduce the probability of war is a desire
to limit the intensity of conflict if war
docs brenk out. [n cffect, this is an
attempt to prevent certain kinds of
wars-the more violent kinds-rather
than a general effort to prevent all war.
The effort to reduce the inten~ily of
war today gains much of its urgeney
from the existence of nuclcar weapons
and their delivery systems. I t is widcly
recognized that a total nuclear war
would be destructive heyond anything
that has been imagined heretofore, and
this makes the problem of preventing
large-scale nuclear war a first order of
priority.
There are three main points to be
considered here: (I) not all arms control
or disarmament arrangements serve to
limit intensity if war does break out; (2)
in making some kinds of war less likely
we may be increasing the prohahility of
other kinds; and 0) a lower initial level
of armament does not necessarily ensure
a less violent war.
Certain kinds of arms control measures, designed to reduce the prohability
of nuclear war, may accomplish that
purpose but at the same time actually
increase the destructiveness of war if it
does break out. For example, a bnn on
defensive systems, such as the t\ Bi\l,
might enhance the credibility of dt'terrence and thus reduce the probability of
nuclear war. But if nuclear war did
hrt'ak out und!'r tht'se circulIIstances.
holh $ides would be lik('ly to $11I"[l'r
considerahly greater destruction than if
they had effective defensive systems.
So lon~ as deterrence remains a

primary means of !'ecurity, the deploynwnt hy either sidt' of a really df(·(·tive
ABi\1 systcm would havc a serious destabilizing effect. First, by assuring the
power which deploys it that the
enemy's offensive weapons could no
longer deliver unacceptable damage, it
lessens inhibitions ngainst emharking on
courses of action which might lead to
nuclear war. Second, it forces the other
side in self-defense to escalate the arms
race in an attempt to restore the previous balance.
Even more dangerous, and more
likely, is an AB'\1 defense which would
ht' effective only if a first strike tJrilsticully reduced the enemy's offensive
cupahility. Then, in a crisis situatioll,
this would forc(' sl'rious consilli'ration
of launching a prcemptive strike to
accomplish this drastic reduction.
Similarly, it would tend to make any
enemy triggcr happy for fear of being
caught on the ground by such a preemptive strike.
Thus, both offensive and defensive
weupons arc part of the arms race, and
in a situation of mutual deterrence,
peace is most stable if both sides possess
an assured capacity to inflil't unacceptable dnmnge on the other side even aftcr
ahsorbing a surprise allack. All other
things being equal, it sCl'ms c1enr that an
arms control agrcemcnt limiting ABM
dcployment hy hoth the United States
mHI the U.S.S.R. to, at most, a "thin"
tJl'ployment is in the best interest of
hoth countries. Paradoxically, in n
world of nuclear weapons and mutual
deterrence, improvements in defcnse
can incrense the likelihood of war.
The serond point is that measures
which reduce the probability of one
kind of wnr can increase the probability
of other kinds. As alrcndy mentioned,
any reduction in the f('ar that smaller
eonflicts lIIay I'~ealate to nudear war
cO\lld ~ervc Lo reduce inhihitions a~aillHt
cngaging in Iimitcd wars. Further, any
scrious rcduction in conventional military capability by mcnns of arms con-
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trol ean reduce the capacity of estabIh;lwd ~overnmenLc; to dl'fend themselves against insurgency, thus increasing
the incentives for potential insurgents
and therefore the probability of civil
war.
The third point is that a lower level
of armamenLc; docs not necessarily ensure a less violent war if war docs break
out. A conflict in which one opponent
is wdl prepared may result in a sharp,
short war with a quick decision. Cases in
point might he the Arah-Israeli conf1iC'ls. On the other hand, if hoth or
nritlwr arc prrpared for war, early
engag('Ill('nts might result in mutual
drstruelion of ready forces followed by
a long process of further mobilization
and aLlrition and greater destrudiveness
and violence overall. I t is not intended
to imply that wars will always he more
surr~ieal and 11<'nee less violent when
hl'twl'en militarily prepared nations, hut
only that lower levds of armament do
not IH·c(·ssarily insure a less d"strudive
war.
In <Ill('mpting to limit the intensity
of war, the most important thing we ean
ask of any arms control arrangement is
that it redure thr prospect of large-scale
war-particularly of large-scale war using
w('apons of mass destruction. In so
doing we must rr~alize that it may Il(~
l1('eessary to accept some increased prospect of le~ser wars. Al'o IJI'fore, no arms
con trol mrasure can provide a panacea.
Relative Advantage. lIistoril~ally,
arms control or disarmament aweements have heen successfully negoliatl'd
only where a careful aLLempt has heen
made to esscntially preserve prevailing
strength ratios among the participating
nations. Despite this, any control or
reduction of armaments will almost
inevitably produce shifts in relative
powl·r.
Ohviously, a change in relativc pow('r
status will occur bclwl'l'n tlw participants in the al!rrement anrl the nonparticipants. For c?,ample, a hilateral agrce-

mcnt he tween the United States and the
U.S.S.R. to drastically reduce levels of
armament might be successful in preserving the approximate balance of military strength hetween those two powers
hut would increase the relative strength
of Communist China.
A second kind of shift is more subtle.
No two countries havc exactly the same
kind of security problems, and therefore
the utility of any particular kind of
weapons system varies from country to
country. Historically, Great Britain emphasized the importance of a strong
navy, while continental powers placcd
first emphasis upon their armies. In the
contemporary world, land-hased, medium-range missiles would appear to
have more utility for the Soviet Union
than for the United States. Thus, even
where some kind of numerical ratio is
preserved, the implications Of control or
reduction of arms differ.
To pursue the maller further, it has
already heen pointed out that arms
control can havc thc effect of making
cerLain kinds of wars more likely or less
likely. This can significantly affect the
relativc power of nations. For cxample,
gcneral and complete disarmament, that
is the abolition of major wcapons and
forces, wen' it fca1;ihle, would have
~wveral notmvorthy effects Oil the relativc strength of nations. Jt would almost
certainly reduce the influence of the
major powers. By reducing the capacity
of esLabli~hed governments to put down'
insurgenLs, it might encourage "wars of
national libcration." This would not
nec(~ssarily be a disadvantage to the
West. Had (l:cneral disarmament heen in
effect in 1968, it seems rcasonahle to
helieve that Czechoslovakia, for exampl(~, would no longer be a Soviet
salellitc.
In general, thc effects of arms control agreements arc to reduce the military power of the parties relative Lo the
rcst of the world and to cause a raLhcr
complex shift in their power relative to
each other. Thc probability is strong
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that under any substantial arms conlrol,
major powers will have to accept, on
balance, some relative as well as absolute diminution in military power. Some
relative disadvantage may, of course, be
accepted if other arguments in favor of
the agreement are strong. In the nature
of things, however, any proposal which
shifts the balance clearly in one's own
favor relative to potential opponents is
unlikely to be accepted by the other
side. Furthermore, the two sides are not
likely to view any specific proposal in
the same way.
Arms Control and Military Expenditure. At a time when domestic claims
upon governmental resources are climbing sharply, one of the particularly
attractive features of the prospect of
arms control is the expectation that
large sums
money can be saved. At
first glance this would appear to be so,
for the essence of arms control is the
acceptance of a lower level of military
investment, at least of a particular kind,
than would otherwise have been made.
Unfortunalt'ly, the relationship is not
quite that simple-limitations on armament do not necessarily save money.
Systems of arms control themselves
can be quite expensive. The inspection
requirements necessary to ensure observance of an agreement may involve
elaborate and highly technical surveillance or inspections systems which,
in some cases, may be more expensive
than the armaments themselves. Thus,
even in terms of direct expenditures,
arms control does not necessarily lead
to savings.
Somewhat more difficult to analyze
is the matter of indirect effecls upon
long-term costs. There are at least three
ways in which indirect effects can prevent us from realizing the anticipated
savings from an arms control agreement.
First, effective controls on one kind
of armament may simply shift the arms
competition to another kind of armament or, perhaps, to a qualitative basis

of

if quantity' is controlled. In this case,
arms expenditures may well continue as
high as before, either through a redistribution of expenditures on military hardware or due to new R&D expenses and
higher per-unit costs.
Second, an arms control agreement
may serve simply to change the timing
of expenditures. The historical tendency
of the United Statcs unilatcrally to
alternate periods of low armament with
periods of urgcnt rearmament, as in
1941 and 1950, has almost certainly
been economically wasteful as well as
militarily awkward. To follow the sallle
pattern through agreed' arms control-if
the agrcement did not stick-could
prove to be equally wasteful.
Finally, as discussed more thoroughly earlier, an improperly conceived
arms control plan can actually increase
the chances of war-and the costs of
modern war are such that they far
overshadow any feasible peacetime
savings on arms expenditure. Any saving
which resulted in increased probability
of war could prove to be both temporary and illusory.
Quite certainly, ceonomil's through
arms reduction are possible. The point is
that savings are not automatic, but need
to hl' carefully assessed in terms of both
dircet and indirect costs.
Arms Control and Nonmilitary Objectives. The final critcrion against
which any arms control proposal must
be evaluated is its effect upon national
objectives other than security. This is
perhaps the most complex and most
difficult to assess of all of the criteriahut so important that it cannot he
ignored. No maller how wc define our
national goals-life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; human dignity; freedom and justice for all-security is only
a very partial means to the achievement
of those goals, and there is a real danger
that some of the measures which enhance security in a military sense are
inimical to other goals.
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There are a variety of considerations
which fall into this category, ranging
from the pacifist argument that all
violence and therefore all implements of
war are immoral and should be done
away with on purely moral grounds, to
the argument that the international tensions engendered hy high levels of armament interfere with the proper operation of the international economic
system. Beyond pointing out their potential relevance, any comprehensive
discussion of thcge varying concerns is
outside the scope of this artiele. Hcre it
is sufficient only to consider the most
important nonmilitary implication of
arms control: the view that high Icvels
of armament tcnd to corrupt democratic institutions.
There is a popular helief, in some
ways a peculiarly, American helief, that
there is a hasic incompatibility hctween
standing military forces and the proper
functioning of a dcmocratic political
system. Perhaps lhe most systematic
and well-known statement of this view
is Harold La:.-:swe1l's "garrison-state
hypothesis." First statcd in 19:~7 and
periodically restated and revised sincc
that time, the garrison-state hypothesis
remains a leading theory of civil-military
relations, not only among intcllectuals,
bUl in the popular press as well.
The essence of the garrison-state
hypothesis is that a prolonged state of
international tension incviLahly drives
internal politics in the nations concerned toward thc domination of specialists on violence. Lasswell has descrihed it as "a model in which the
sequence marches from the relatively
mixed elite pattern of the nineteenth
cl'ntury to military-police dominance in
the impending future."5 Power becomes
centralized in the hands of the executive
and the military, with the legislature
hecoming inl'rea~ingly impotent. The
central govern nll'1l t expands until it
penetratcs tlH~ whole society. In Lasswell's view, thc danger of thus destroying free instituti9ns through the effect

of long continued preparation for war is
a greater evil than war itself.
To the extent that Lasswell's model
is an accurate representation of the real
world, an agreed program of arms control or reduction would help to preserve
free institutions if it reduced international tensions and diminished tendencies toward centralization and governmental expansion.
The purpose of this discussion is not
to attempt a detailed critique of the
garrison-state hypothesis, but only to
make a limited assessment. [An excellent critique can be found in Huntington's The Soldier and the Slate.]6 Few
would argue that prolonged tension and
high levels of armament are beneficial to
a free society-though the linkage betWl!en democratic frailty and levels of
armament is much less direct than Lasswell would have us believe. After all, the
rearmament of Germany followed, not
preceded, the collapse of the Weimar
Republic.
The garrison-state hypothesis, as formulated hy Lasswell, is in part based on
a rather simplistic and villainous view of
the professional military and an exaggeration of their strength in modern
society. By far the strongest part of his
case lies in the linkage hetween longsustained high levels of armament and
the tendency toward expansion of the
government and centralization of
power. In the pn!senee of long continued and obvious exlernal threats,
lhere is a natural lendeney toward the
dominance of national security concerns
over individual interests. Dissent may
become treason, so that long-continued
tension is inimical to personal liberty.
The growth of large industries dependent upon military expenditures and the
large bureaucratic requirements accompanying the maintenance of a large
modern military establishment have a
l'trong tendency to increase the size mill
role of the federal government and lo
centralize aUlhority.
The two things which an effective
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arms control agrcement could reasonably be expected to do which 'would
minimize the dangers outlined by Lasswell are: (1) hy reducing international
tensions and therefore national fears,
reduce the degree to which security
considerations influence governmental
deeisions~ and (2) by reducing the level
of armament, alleviate the tendencies
toward bigness and centralization inherent in large-scale military organization and procurement.
The nonmilitary effects of any arms
control or disarmament arrangement arc
not only an important eonsidl'ration in
evaluating it, hut olle of the more
compelling reasons for entering into
such an arrangement. The primary reason for our concern with national security is the preservation of those values
we rate most highly. It would be selfdefeating if, through the search for
security, we lost that which we were
attempting to preserve.
The Utility of Arms Control. Many
pl!ople tend to sec arms control or
disarmament as an end in itself and
therefore most discussions focus on the
problem of how it is to be achieved,
without careful consideration of what it
is intended to achieve or what it is
capahle of achieving. Without a clear
understanding of ohjl'etives, arm~ con. trol can be self-defeating or even dangerous.
This discussion has examined five
objectives against which any attempt at
arms control should be evaluated. These
objectives are: a reduction in the prohability of war; a reduction in the intensity and duration of war; improvement of our position relative to potential opponents; a reduction in security
costs; and achievement of nonmilitary
ohjeetives. These objectives apply to
arms control and disarmament in all
their forms, although there will he wide
discrepancies in the way and extent to
which various forms satisfy the tests.
The ohjectives outlined may as appro-

priatcly he ul'er! to evaluate a scheme of
unilateral disarmament as to evaluate a
formal arms control treaty with elaborate inspection provisions.
Because of the multiplicity of ohjectives which may be served by arms
control and because no arms control
arrangement can serve all objectives
equally, it is necessary to have a clear
understanding of the trade-offs required. An assessment of marginal
utility is involved: it is necessary to
compare the worth of incremental improvements in one area with 10SSl'S in
anotlH'r. For example: we would all\lo~t
certainly he willing to accept some loss
ill military capability vis-a-vis the rest of
the world in return for a reduced
probability of war and a lower level of
military investment. We would not, or
should not, accept an arrangement
which promised large economic savings
while increasing the probability of nuclear war.
No simple way of assessing these
trade-offs exists, .for fundamental and
necessarily subjective valucs arc concerned. There is no substitute for a
careful analysis of any arms control
arrangement in terms of the magnitude
and direction of the effect it will have
on each of the five possible objectives;
the prospective gains must he weighed
against the prospective losses. Although
it is obviously desirable to achieve the
greatest benefit and the least loss, the
interests of potential opponents limit
the gains to be expe.eted. Fortunately,
what is a gain for one is not necessarily
a loss for the other, for both sides share
a compelling interest in attempting to
limit the violence, destruction, and
bloodshed of human conflict. Few
human values could survive a large-scale
nnclear war. It is this shared intercst
that makes agreement on arms control
possihle-though by no means easy.
In passing, iL is also important to
note that formal agreements are not
necessarily the only means to the
achievement of effective arms control.
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Far too lillIe attention has been paid to
the imaginative proposals for
"graduated reciprocation in tensionreduction" made by Charles Osgood in
his brilliant lillIe hook t1 n A llernfllive
to War or Surrender. rn essence, Osgood's proposals amount to a program
of reciprocal, stepped reductions in
armament hascd upon tacit and informal hargaining rather than formal
agreements. Although there are serious
difficulties involved in his proposals,
there is no reason to believe that they
arc any legs suscI:ptibh: to solution than
thot"e involved in a negotiated agreement. For example, one of the more
serious difficulties, the lack of any
effective inspection system, beeomes
much less serious hecause of the recent
improvements in national surveillance
systems.
Whatever the form of an arms control agreement, it is imperative that the
ends we arc trying to achieve be kept
clearly in view and that we do not let
arms control or disarmament become an
end in itself. Yet thrre is also a serious
dan~I'r that an awareness of all of the

potential pitfalls of arms control will
prevent it IH'ing undertake'n seriously as
a means to our security. This would he a
mistake. Properly coneeiwd and undertaken, arms control can greatly enhanee~
our .security and may very well provc to
be a neccssity if we are to avoid disaster.
As we hecome accustomed to living
under the nuclear cloud, there is danger
of forgetting just how precarious a position the world is in. A major war fought
with nuclear, hiological, or chemical
weapons could not conceivahly he of
either immediate or long-term advantage
to anyone and might well he the occasion
of universal disaster. Yet paradoxically,
hoth we and the Russians, in the interest
of national security, continue to stockpile weapons which, if used, would he a
disasterfor hoth.
I t is difficult to be optimistic about
the prospects for finding an easy way
out of this dilemma. Mankind has not
heretofore compiled a very enviable
rccord in avoiding foreseeable disasterbut we do have to try, and thc effort to
achieve useful and workahle arms COlltrol arrangements is one way of trying.
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